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 1. Introduction 
While the current proportion of old-age population of Korea is lower than other OECD 
countries, the speed of population aging is very high. Even though the proportion of the 
population aged 65 and older was 7.2% as of 2000, much lower than the developed countries, 
the proportion is projected to increase to 23.1% in 2030, almost the same as their projected 
average. More old-age dependents relative to workers resulting from population aging 
suggest the likelihood of more consumption relative to income and, therefore, less national 
saving. Increase in the old-age dependency ratio substantially affects the fiscal policies. The 
government expenditure such as public pension benefits and medical insurance benefits will 
increase rapidly as the population is aging. Public assistance program for the low-income 
classes is also expected to increase since the poverty rate for old-age population is higher 
than that of working ages in Korea. On the other hand, the decrease in working population 
will restrict the tax base of the future. As a result, the population aging will increase the fiscal 
burden of future generations, therefore, decrease resource available for them, which suggests 
less saving in the future.  
The long-term budgetary imbalance in Korea will also contribute to the future savings 
reduction through the increase in fiscal burden of future generations. Even though the 
consolidated budget balance at present maintains surplus, the budget balance will turn deficit 
in the near future and the magnitude of the deficit will rapidly rise in the future if Korean 
government maintains the current fiscal policies. In particular, long-term budgetary 
imbalance of public pensions due to too generous promised level of pension benefits 
compared with pension contributions, and prospective increase in Medical Insurance benefits, 
and the resistance to increase in social insurance contributions, will deteriorate the long-term 
budgetary imbalance. Therefore, the current fiscal stance of Korean government will shift the 
fiscal burden to the future generations, which will lower the national savings rate in the 
future. 
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the effects of population aging and fiscal policies 
on national savings in Korean situation. For the prediction of the national savings rate of 
Korea for the next several decades, we employ a life-cycle model, which incorporates the 
generational accounting approach needed to assess the distribution of fiscal burden across 
generations. Even though our main focus is on the effects of population aging and fiscal 
stance, we also study the effects of change in asset composition, such as annuitization of 
asset resulting from maturing of public pensions and introduction of reverse annuity 
mortgages through the estimation of consumption functions, which enables comparison of 
elasticity of consumption with respect to various kinds of wealth. We found that the rapid 
population aging and long-term budgetary imbalance will substantially lower the national 
savings rate in Korea. A sensitivity analysis based on an alternative model, an altruistic 
family model, shows that these predictions are robust to the specification of altruism among 
generations. In addition, the estimation results of consumption functions with respect to 
various kinds of wealth suggest that the annuitization of wealth due to maturing of public 
pensions and introduction of reverse annuity mortgage is likely to further decrease the 
savings rate in the future. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the 
demographic transition in Korea for the next several decades, based on our population 
projection. Section 3 explains our basic framework for the prediction of savings rate of the 
future, a life-cycle model in which the agents’ consumption and savings is determined by the 
propensity to consume and the magnitude of resource available for the remaining lifetime, 
including human wealth, current asset holdings, and the value of net transfer income from the 
government. Section 4 explains the data source used to estimate the propensity to consume, 
which is used in the projection of consumption and savings, the method of imputation of 
human wealth and net transfer income from government. Section 5 presents our findings, and 
Section 6 summarizes and concludes the paper. 
2. Demographic Transition in Korea 
Figures 1-3 summarize the population projection based on the 2001 population projection 
model of National Statistics Office (NSO) of Korea. The 2001 NSO projection covers the 
period 2001-2050. We extend the population projection up to 2110 using the NSO’s 
assumptions about fertility rates1, mortality rates2, and international mobility rates3. Baseline 
calculations are conducted under the assumption that the total fertility rate and age-sex 
mortality rates will remain constant at their 2050 levels until 2110.  
The figures indicate that Korea will experience drastic change in demographic structure as 
well as total population. The total population is projected to reach maximum level around 
2025 and then decrease rapidly. The proportion of the aged 65 and older will increase from 
9% (as of 2005) up to 38% and that of the economically active population, aged 15-64, will 
decrease from 71% to 53%, which implies that while the current proportion of old-age 
                                               
1
 We made 3 alternative fertility rate assumptions, high, medium, and low fertility rate assumption. Our base 
case result is based on the medium fertility assumption (see Table 3). 
2
 The average life expectancy is projected to rise from currently 76 years to 83 years in 2050. 
3
 International movement of population is limited in Korea. For example, net immigration in 2000 was 11 
thousand (emigration 43 thousand, immigration 54 thousand). We assume that the international movement rates 
remain constant at their 2050 levels until 2110. 
population is smaller than other OECD countries (see Table 2), the speed of population aging 
is very high, because of a low fertility rate and prolonged life expectancy. In particular, the 
fertility rate of Korea is much lower than many other OECD countries4. Moreover, National 
Statistics Office of Korea projects that the total fertility rate will decrease from 1.47 (2000) to 
1.40 (2040), which will accelerate the process of population aging5.  
United Nations (1998) projection also shows that the proportion of the population aged 65 
and older will increase from 7.2% (as of 2000), much lower than the average of developed 
countries (14.4%), to 23.1% (2030), almost the same as their projected average (22.6%). The 
time required for the old-age population proportion to increase from 7% (14%) to 14% (20%) 
is 19 years (7 years), which is much shorter than in other developed countries (France (115 
years (41 years)), U.S. (71 years (15 years)), Japan (24 years (12 years))). Thus, Korea will 
age much faster than any other OECD countries. 
3. Basic Framework 
We adopt a life-cycle framework for the prediction of savings rates of the next several 
decades. The economy is populated with a large number of individuals who belong to 
different cohorts indexed by the year of their birth. The individuals do not face mortality risks 
and live for D years. We assume that each agent in the economy makes decision on 
consumption flow and the magnitude of bequest to maximize the lifetime expected utility. The 
objective function and the budget constraint of the agent aged a  at year t are as follows:   
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4
 The fertility rate of Korea as of 2000 was 1.47. The rates for other OECD countries are 1.36 (Germany), 1.88 
(France), 1.41 (Japan), 2.06 (U.S.), 1.64 (U.K.). 
5
 The fertility rate has fallen up to 1.13 (as of 2003), lower than its assumed level in 2030 under the base case 
assumption. However, we do not reflect this drastic change in fertility of recent years in the fertility assumption, 
since the change might be temporary change resulting from economic crisis since 1997 triggered by foreign 
currency deficiency, which is followed by economic recession. 
where )(),(,, ⋅⋅ vubC represent consumption and magnitude of bequest, differentiable strictly 
concave utility functions of consumption6 and bequest, respectively. And, , A, W, B, T are 
discount rate, current asset holdings, non-capital income, transfer payment from the 
government, and tax payment to the government.  
The lifetime budget constraint implies that the present value of consumption and bequest is 
not more than the total wealth available for the remaining lifetime, which is composed of 
asset holdings at present ( taA , ), human wealth ( taHW , ), which is the present value of non-
capital income earned for the remaining lifetime, and the net government transfer wealth 
( taNB , ), which is defined as the present value of transfer income from the government minus 
tax payment.  
The optimization of the agent aged a at period t yields the following path of consumption 
and bequest. 
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where f  and g  are the marginal rate of substitution functions for the homothetic utility. 
 
Using equation (3) and (4) together with lifetime budget constraint, we solve for the 
consumption of the aged a. 
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The equation (5) shows that an individual’s consumption at the age of a is the product of 
total asset available for the remaining lifetime and this age’s average propensity to 
consumption out of the total asset ( taPC , ). The equation (5) is our basic framework to project 
the consumption rate for the next several decades.  
We follow several steps for the projection. We first estimate the average propensity to 
consume, by age and sex, out of total asset using micro data set. Then, we project the 
magnitude of total assets by age and sex, including current asset holdings, human wealth, and 
                                               
6
 We define the utility as function of age as well as consumption amount to reflect the difference in preference 
across ages. 
the net government transfer wealth, for the next several decades. Finally, we compute the 
consumption amount by age and sex for each year and savings rate.  
The national savings are composed of the private savings and the government savings. The 
private savings are the difference of the total income, the sum of wage income, capital income 
and net transfer from government, and consumption (see equation (6)). The current asset 
holdings evolve following the equation (7). 
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The government saving is defined as the (primary) budget surplus of the government: i.e. 
tax revenue - transfer payment - government consumption ( tGC ) (see equation (8)), and the 
national income ( tY ) is the sum of labor income and capital income (see equation (9)).  
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where ta,µ  is the population of the aged a at period t . 
4. Data and Imputations 
To predict future savings rates, we need to estimate the average propensity to consume, and 
predict the magnitude of human wealth, and the net government transfer wealth by age for the 
future, in addition to each year’s Gross National Product (GNP) and government consumption, 
which we discuss in section 3. In this section we discuss the procedures of estimating the 
average propensity to consume, and projection of the magnitude of human wealth, and the net 
government transfer wealth for the future period. 
4. 1. Estimating the average propensity to consume 
We use Korea Labor and Income Panel Study (KLIPS)7 to estimate the average propensity 
to consume. KLIPS consists of household survey and individual survey. The household 
survey contains information about the income, consumption, and asset holdings, including 
                                               
7
 The KLIPS stated to survey from 1998 and its most recent survey is 2002 survey. We use the 1999-2002 
surveys for the estimation of the average propensity to consume. 
real estate and financial asset, of households. The individual survey contains information 
about the current employment status, current level of wage and income of the self-employed, 
job experience of the past, public pension participation status, and current pension benefits 
amount. 
As mentioned in section 3, total asset consists of current asset holdings, human wealth, and 
net government transfer wealth. We assume that total asset holdings of each household are 
equally distributed among the household head and his/her spouse.  
We compute individuals’ human wealth, the present value of non-capital income for the 
remaining lifetime,  ∏
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employment rate8. We assume that the average wage growth rate and the discount rate are 
1.5% and 3.5%9 per annum in real term.  
To compute the government transfer wealth, we first compute the net public pension wealth 
from the KLIPS sample. For the retired people, we use the reported public pension benefit 
amount. For the people currently working, we use pension benefit formula and contribution 
rules of public pensions. In that process, we explicitly take into account the value of each 
individual’s already acquired pension benefit wealth, which is reflected in his/her job 
experience of the past, as well as the expected value of net pension wealth, which will be 
acquired by the contributions in the future. The value of the latter is dependent upon the 
expectations about the future employment status and government policy change. We assume 
that each individual’s employment status of the future follows the same path of the 
employment rate by age and sex. We assume that the individuals in the sample maintain 
myopic expectations about the future government fiscal policies, since we do not have any 
consensus about the public pension reform. As for the other components of the government 
transfer wealth, related with social insurance, means-test public aid programs, and taxes, the 
KLIPS does not contain enough information to impute their value. Therefore, we take an 
alternative approach, which uses the generational accounts (GA) separated across the 
components of fiscal policies. We compute the ratio of the negative value of the whole 
generational accounts, i.e. the value of the net government transfer wealth10, to that of public 
pensions, reported in Table 10, and multiply this ratio with net public pension wealth 
computed using KLIPS sample to get the value of the net government transfer wealth. Table 5 
                                               
8
 Table 4 shows the population distribution, employment rate, and the average income by age and sex in 5th year 
(2002) sample of KLIPS as an example. 
9
 This value is based on the real interest rate of government bonds in recent years. 
10
 Section 4.3 explains the procedure of GA calculations and the GA values for the components of fiscal policies. 
The GA is defined as the present value of the net tax payment to government (taxes minus transfer income), of 
the representative agent of each generation for the remaining lifetime. Therefore, the net government transfer 
wealth defined in Section 3 is equivalent to the negative value of the GA. 
reports the value of net public pension wealth and the net government transfer wealth by age 
and sex. The value of the net public pension wealth shows an irregular age profiles, since 
Korean public pension consists of two different plans: occupational pensions (OCP) which 
covers government employees, private school employees and military personnel; and national 
pension (NPS) which covers the rest of Korean residents. Since the NPS, which covers most 
of Korean residents, was introduced in 1988, most of NPS participants have not acquired 
entitlement of pension benefits. The OCP was first introduced in 1960 to cover the 
government employees and military personnel, and expanded the coverage to private school 
employees in 1975. Since the OCP’s are relatively mature plans, they have produced many 
pension benefit recipients. However, the net pension wealth reported in Table 5 shows that 
pension wealth of the aged 75 and older is 0, since the KLIPS sample does not cover many 
occupational pension recipients. The imputed value of the net government transfer wealth 
shows negative for most of cohorts, because the value does not reflect the value of 
government consumption. It is also because the transfer payment from government is not 
large at present due to immature public pension systems and small magnitude of expenditure 
of public aid programs11.  
To impute the individual’s consumption, we need assumption on the distribution of 
consumption within family. We use Besanger et al. (2000)’s estimate of age-profile of 
consumption within family in Australia12. The average propensity to consumption is defined 
as ratio of consumption level to total wealth. We compute the average propensity to consume, 
using 1999-2002 KLIPS samples, and use the average level for the period in the projection of 
the savings rate for the several decades.  
4. 2. Projecting human wealth and current asset-holdings 
The magnitude of human wealth and current asset holdings of the future are computed 
based on the assumption that the productivity growth rate and interest rate remain constant: i.e. 
we adopt a partial equilibrium approach. The productivity growth rate and interest rate are 
assumed 1.5% and 3.5% per annum in real term. The projection begins with imputation of 
aggregate value of asset and human capital stock at the benchmark year. The aggregate labor 
income is assumed 60% of GDP based on the record of labor income share for the period 
1990-2003. We compute the distribution of wage income by age and sex, by allocating the 
aggregate value based on the age-sex profile of wage income estimated by the Ministry of 
                                               
11
 Table 10 shows that the generational accounts for most of cohorts are positive, which implies that most of 
taxpayers pay more taxes than they receive from the government. 
12
 Besanger et al. (2000) also estimated the distribution of consumption among family members for the case of 
U.S.. 
Labor (2001). Then we use the definition of human capital (see equation (2)), to compute the 
stock value of human capital for the next several decades. 
The aggregate value of asset holdings is assumed to be aggregate capital income, 40% of 
GDP, divided by the interest rate. We impute the age-sex distribution of asset holdings in the 
benchmark year using the asset holding profile by age and sex using the 1999-2002 KLIPS 
survey. The distribution following the benchmark year is computed using equations (6)-(7). 
4. 3. Projecting net government transfer wealth 
The net government transfer wealth is the present value of the transfer income from the 
government minus tax payment to the government for the remaining lifetime, which is the 
negative value of generational accounts.  
Computing generational accounts is based on the government’s intertemporal budget 
constraint. This constraint, written as equation (10), requires that the future net tax payments 
of current and future generations be sufficient, in present value, to cover the present value of 
future government consumption as well as service the government’s initial net debt. 
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The first summation on the left-hand side of (10) adds together the generational accounts of 
existing generations. The term Nt,t-s stands for the account of the generation born in year t-s. 
The index s in this summation runs from age 0 to age D, the maximum length of life. The 
second summation on the left-hand side of (10) adds together the present value of remaining 
net payments of future generations, with s representing the number of years after year t that 
each future generation is born. The first term on the right-hand side of (10) is the present 
value of government consumption. In this summation the values of government consumption, 
Gs in year s, are discounted by the pre-tax real interest rate, r. The remaining term on the 
right-hand side, gtW , denotes the government’s net wealth in year t − its assets minus its 
explicit debt. 
Equation (10) indicates the zero sum nature of intergenerational fiscal policy. Holding the 
present value of government consumption fixed, a reduction in the present value of net taxes 
extracted from current generations (a decline in the first summation on the left side of (10)) 
necessitates an increase in the present value of net tax payment of future generations. 
The term Nt,k in (10) is defined by: 
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In expression (11), Ts,k stands for the projected average net tax payments to the government 
made in year s by the generation born in year k. The term Ps,k stands for the number of 
surviving members of the cohort in year s who were born in year k. For the generations who 
are born in year k, where k>t, the summation begins in year k. Regardless of the generation’s 
year of birth, the discounting is always back to year t. A set of generational accounts is simply 
a set of values of Nt,k, one for each existing and future generation, with the property that the 
combined present value adds up to the right-hand side of equation (10).  
The traditional Generational Accounts are calculated in two steps. The first step involves 
calculation of the net tax payments of current generations (the first term on the left-hand-side 
of equation (10)). This is done on the basis of current fiscal rules without being constrained by 
the intertemporal budget constraint of the government. In the second step, given the right-
hand-side of equation (10) and the first term on the left-hand-side of equation (10), we 
determine, as a residual, the value of the second term on the left-hand side of equation (10), 
which is the collective payment, measured as a time-t present value, required of future 
generations. Accordingly, whereas the fiscal burdens for current generations are based entirely 
on current fiscal rules, the government budget constraint fully determines the fiscal burdens 
for future generations.  
Based on the collective amount required of future generations, we determine the average 
present value of lifetime net tax payments for each member of each future generation under 
the assumption that the average lifetime tax payments of successive generations rise at the 
economy’s rate of productivity growth. Leaving out this growth adjustment, the lifetime net 
tax payments of future generations are directly comparable with those of current newborns, 
since the generational accounts of both newborns and future generations take into account net 
tax payments over these generations’ entire lifetimes. Measuring the generational imbalance 
as the difference between two lifetime tax burdens provides a measure for the sustainability of 
the public finances. If future generations bear a heavier tax burden than the newly born do, 
current fiscal rules will have to be adjusted in the future to meet the budget constraint. 
We modify the presentation of generational accounts to make the generational accounts 
appropriate for calculation of consumption level of generations who will survive for the next 
several decades. We compute the generational accounts by age and sex at every year for the 
next several decades, because the consumption by age and sex at each year is dependent upon 
the net government transfer wealth, the negative value of generational accounts, at the year. 
The standard approach estimates the fiscal gap between current and future generations, 
 
	
assuming existing policy for current generations. It is also customary to express this fiscal gap 
using other measures, such as the required changes in taxes and or transfer payments for 
current and future generations together. Because it is likely that some of the burden will be 
placed on current generations and there are differing effects of required changes in taxes and 
transfer payment across future generations, we take this latter approach one step further and 
actually present alternative estimates of the accounts for current generations and future 
generations, taking such projected increases in their fiscal burden into account. In addition we 
also renew the generational accounts for non-zero age groups. For example, we renew the 
accounts the cohort aged a every year, who were a-1 years old in the previous year, and this 
process continues until this cohort reaches the age D, the maximum length of life. The 
renewal of the accounts is necessary, because the consumption of the aged a is dependent 
upon the renewed accounts. We denote as GA1 the accounts as conventionally presented, and 
refer to the modified accounts incorporating the adjustment to restore fiscal balance as GA2.13  
Table 10 reports standard generational accounts (GA1) for Korea14, under the base case 
assumptions for the productivity growth rate (1.5 percent) and the real discount rate (3.5 
percent).15 The table shows positive values of net payments for most cohorts alive in our 
benchmark year 2000 for GA calculation, except for cohorts aged 90 or older, indicating that 
most generations will, on balance, pay more in present value than they receive. One reason for 
positive burdens even among the elderly is the high taxes on consumption, capital income and 
assets, relative to taxes on labor income.16 The age profile of the average tax burden on capital 
is more skewed to older age groups than that of labor income taxes, and the consumption tax 
burden for older age groups is quite high.  
The more important reason that even older generations have positive net payments is that 
social welfare benefits such as public pension benefits, Medical Insurance (MI) benefits, 
Minimum Living Standards Security (MLSS) benefits and other social welfare services 
(OSTP) were quite small in the aggregate as of 2000. Aggregate public pension and MI 
benefits were 1.1 percent and 1.7 percent of GDP respectively as of 2000 and those for the 
MLSS and the OSTP were 0.5 percent and 0.6 percent of GDP respectively. However, 
maturation of the public pension system and the projected increase in social welfare 
                                               
13
 Similar presentation method to this one has been used by others in the past, including Auerbach and 
Oreopoulos (2000) and Bovenberg and ter Rele (2000). 
14
 The data source and calculation procedure is explained in detail in Auerbach and Chun (2005) and Auerbach 
et al (2005). 
15
 The accounts are expressed in thousands of won, the domestic currency of Korea. As of July 2005, 1,025 won 
were worth about US$1. 
16
 Revenues from consumption tax, capital income tax, taxes on asset holding, and labor income tax in South 
Korea as of 2000 were 9.1 percent, 5.1 percent, 1.3 percent, and 2.2 percent of GDP respectively.  
 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expenditures will increase transfer payments to old-age groups. This maturation is shown in 
Figure 4, which displays the relative (to age-40 males) benefit profile in 2000 along with the 
corresponding profiles projected at other dates through 2080. As a result, the accounts for a 
wider range of old-age groups will turn negative in the future, given current policy.  
The row labeled “Future Gen.” indicates the present value of amounts that those born in 
2001 will, on average, pay, assuming that subsequent generations pay this same amount 
except for the adjustment for growth. The account for future generations is about 118 percent 
larger than those for those aged 0, which implies that the current fiscal policies are not 
sustainable and that a substantial fiscal burden is shifted to future generations.  
Table 10 also reports the present value, rest-of-life transfer benefits and tax burdens by 
category. The substantial negative entries for public pensions and Medical Insurance play a 
key role in the large overall generational imbalance. On the tax side, three important 
characteristics of the Korean tax system are: (i) the large share of consumption taxes; (ii) the 
relative unimportance of labor income taxes; and (iii) the large proportion accounted for by 
taxes on asset transactions. The largest present value (for ages 0 and age 30) is the 
consumption tax, followed by the capital income tax, the tax on asset transactions, labor 
income tax, other taxes, and taxes on asset holdings. The present value of the tax burden on 
older age groups, relative to that on younger age groups, is heaviest for consumption taxes, 
followed by capital income taxes, taxes on asset holding, taxes on asset transactions, and 
labor income taxes. 
Figure 5 reports the GA217, omitting the accounts for the non-zero aged in the future, 
under alternative scenarios to attainment long-term fiscal balance of government budget: (i) 
no change in fiscal policies; (ii) increasing tax burden of the cohorts alive in 2010 and 
thereafter by 23.1% of tax burden under current policies; and (iii) maintaining budget balance 
every year (pay-as-you-go scheme). The case (i) is a hypothetical situation where the 
government does not intend to attain long-term budgetary balance, thus, this should be 
treated as a benchmark case to evaluate the effects of policy changes to attain long-term 
budgetary balance. The Case (ii) is a scheme of prefunding, since under this scheme the 
government (primary) budget balance maintains surplus around 2025 and thereafter the 
budget turns deficit. Comparison of the case (i) with the case (ii) or the case (iii) shows that 
the current fiscal policies are not sustainable and to maintain the current policies related with 
government consumption and transfer payments the net tax burden for future generations as 
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 The index for the generations specified in x-axis is according to the year of birth of each cohort, with the 
2000 newborns being generation 0. The generations indexed below zero are current generations and those 
indexed higher then 0 are future generations. The accounts for the future generations are evaluated at the 
productivity value as of 2000 to make the accounts for future generations comparable with those of current 
generations.  
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well as current generations should be substantially raised. The profile of fiscal burden across 
generations is crucially dependent upon the method to attain the long-term budgetary balance. 
The pay-as-you-go scheme (case (iii)) further shifts the fiscal burden to the future 
generations than the prefunding scheme (case (ii)). 
5. Findings 
5. 1. Projected Savings Rates, 2002-2090 
We predict the savings rates for the period 2002-2090, based on the life-cycle framework 
described in section 3, and using the imputed value of current asset holdings, the projected 
value of human wealth, net government transfer wealth explained in section 4. Before our 
prediction, we adjust the average propensity to consume to reproduce the level of aggregate 
consumption in our benchmark year 2002. We adjust the average propensity in two steps. First, 
we reduce the propensity to consume for the aged 75 and older by 50%, since their estimated 
value is extremely high, more than 200% of the value for the aged 70-74. It is also due to the 
fact that the number of observation of the aged 75 and older is very small, thus, the estimated 
value of the average propensity to consume is not reliable. The predicted value of aggregate 
consumption in our benchmark year, using the adjusted propensity to consume, is 413 trillion 
won, 6.2% higher than its actual value. Therefore, we reduce the overall level of the average 
propensity to consume by 6.2%, maintaining its profile by age and sex. 
Tables 11-14 summarize the prediction results. Table 11 shows the predicted value, 
evaluated at the fixed price as of 2002, of the wealth and annual values related with the wealth 
and government budget balance. The non-capital income grows faster than the productivity 
growth rate (1.5% per annum) until late 2010’s despite the population aging, since the total 
population will increase until it reaches a peak around 2025. The growth rate of non-capital 
income falls rapidly, which induces the decrease in growth rate of human wealth, which is 
defined as the present value of non-capital income earned for the remaining lifetime. The 
growth rate of the human wealth is lower than that of non-capital income, because the former 
reflects the decrease in the growth rate of the latter in the future. The human wealth has the 
largest proportion of total wealth.  
The transfer wealth, which is defined as the present value of the net transfer income from 
the government for the remaining lifetime, is negative for the next several decades under the 
current policies. However, its value becomes positive around 2055, which reflects the fact that 
the government transfer payments will increase much faster than the tax revenue due to the 
population aging, maturing of public pensions, and increasing demand for social welfare 
expenditure. Table 10, which summarizes generational accounts for Korea (GA1), shows that 
 
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the accounts for most of current generations are positive, reflecting the fact that the current 
level of government transfer payment is low due to the short history of public pensions and 
low level of social welfare expenditure at present. Despite the positive accounts for most of 
current generations, the generational imbalance of the net payment is very high (118%), since 
the forward-looking property of the generational accounting reflects the rapid increase in 
government transfer payments in the future due to maturing of public pensions, and 
prospective increase in social welfare expenditure resulting from population aging and 
increasing demand for social welfare expenditure18. The negative accounts of public pensions 
and medical insurance and social welfare expenditure (MLSS, OSTP) explains substantial 
part of the generational imbalance. While the growth rate of tax revenue is lower than that of 
government transfer payment because of reduction in economically active population due to 
population aging, the government consumption grows faster than tax revenues, which further 
deteriorates the government budget balance. 
The growth rate of aggregate consumption is higher than the GDP growth rate, due to the 
population aging and increasing age profile of the average propensity to consume, which 
raises the ratio of private consumption to GDP19. The increasing ratio of consumption to GDP 
results in decrease in the value of asset holdings. The absolute level of the asset holdings falls 
after the early 2010’s, which decreases capital income and the GDP growth rate20.  
Tables 13-14 show the predicted savings rates under the alternative assumptions about the 
fiscal policies and fertility rates. We simulate 3 cases: (i) a hypothetical situation where 
current fiscal policies are maintained disregarding the long-term budget imbalance; (ii) an 
economy where the government proportionally adjusts the tax burden of cohorts alive in 2010 
and thereafter to match the present value of tax revenue of the present and the future to that of 
government transfer payment and government consumption (prefunding); and (iii) an 
economy where the government maintains the budget balance every year (budget balance).  
The private savings, and government savings, defined as the government primary budget 
surplus, depend crucially upon the method to restore the long-term budgetary balance. 
Compared with the case (i), the national savings rates, the sum of private and government 
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 Auerbach and Chun (2005) projected that aggregate public pension benefits will increase from 1.1% of GDP 
as of 2000 to 16% in 2080. Benefits of Medical Insurance and public aid programs are projected to increase 
from 1.7% and 1.1% of GDP, respectively, to 5.1%, 2.1% during the same period. The projected level of the 
Medical Insurance benefits and public aid to low-income families is based on very conservative income 
elasticity (1.2). Therefore, the projected levels should be interpreted as their minimum level under current 
policies. 
19
 The ratio rises from 56.8% as of 2002 to 72.5% in 2050. 
20
 The effects on the asset holdings might be exaggerated, since our approach is a partial equilibrium approach. 
Under a general equilibrium approach the effects will be mitigated, since the increase in the rate of return to 
capital will be a buffer to mitigate the reduction in asset holdings. 
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savings rates, in the case of prefunding is higher, since higher level of transfer wealth in case 
(i) induces higher level of consumption and the government budget in case (i) is more 
imbalanced, which implies that delay in the policy revisions to restore the long-term 
government budgetary balance will induce lower savings rate. Comparison of case (ii) and 
case (iii) shows the effects of intergenerational redistribution of net tax burden. Figure 5 
shows that transition from the prefunding scheme to the balanced budget scheme redistributes 
the fiscal burden, defined as net payment to the government, from current generations to 
future generations. This redistrtibution of resource from the future generations to the current 
generations raises the savings rates of current generations. Therefore, the private savings rates 
of the near future are higher in case (iii)21. However, the private savings rates after 2050 are 
higher in case (ii), because under the prefunding scheme, the resource for the future 
generations is much larger than that under the pay-as-you-go scheme. The government 
savings rate of the period after 2020 is lower in the case (ii), since the case (ii) allows the 
budget deficit in the far-away future while the prefunding accumulates the budget surplus in 
the government fund in preparation for the budget deficit in the future.  
Even though there are some variations in the projected savings rate depending on the 
method to restore the long-term budgetary balance, the overall results imply that the drastic 
decrease in the savings rate will be inevitable because of the population aging and its 
magnitude will be substantial. In particular, the decrease in the government savings rate 
resulting from the increase in government’s transfer payments and government consumption 
contributes substantially to the decrease in national savings rate and the absolute magnitude of 
the fall in government savings rate is much larger than that in private savings rate. 
We try a sensitivity analysis on the fertility rates. Changing the fertility rates substantially 
affects the savings rate in the long run. However, the national savings rate of the next several 
decades are not affected much, because we assume gradual change in fertility rate (see Table 
3). It is also because it takes time for the change in the fertility rates, which changes the 
number of newborns, to affect the age structure of population, which affects the aggregate 
value of consumption and savings.  
It is remarkable that in the transition period, increase (decrease) in fertility rate decreases 
(increases) the private and government savings rate, even though the magnitude of the 
decrease (increase) is not very large. Figure 6 shows that even though the increase in fertility 
rates increases private savings (pri sav), the speed of increase in private savings is lower than 
that of GDP for a considerable time, because the increase in the proportion of young 
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 The reditribution of resource to the current generations increases the consumption level of current generations. 
However, the private savings rates also rise since the marginal (also average) propensity to consume is lower 
than 1. 
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population reduces the net transfer payments (gov net trf), which makes the speed of increase 
in disposable income in aggregate lower than that of GDP. Figure 6 also shows that the speed 
of increase in government consumption (gov con) is higher than that of GDP in the transition 
period. It is due to the fact that the increase in young population dependency ratio resulting 
from the increase in fertility rate increases the government consumption for the young 
population, such as educational expenditure, for the transition period, while the rise in the 
fertility rate will reduce the speed of government consumption increase eventually because it 
reduce the proportion of old age population, which reduces the old-age-population-specific 
government consumption. 
5. 2. Further Consideration 
Effects of Altruism 
The life-cycle framework used for the prediction in this paper precludes the possibility of 
consumption smoothing among generations through intergenerational redistribution. We 
investigate its effects, based on an altruistic family model, where the family planner 
maximizes the expected utility over consumption of each surviving member at different dates 
(see equation 12) subject to household budget constraint (see equation (13): 
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where aθ  is the weight in the family utility function given to an age a individual, atP  is the 
surviving population of age a in year t, δ  is a pure rate of time preference, and 0R  is full 
family resources, which is composed of current asset-holdings, human wealth, and net 
government transfer wealth. 
The solution of the maximization problem has the distinctive property that the cross-section 
age-consumption profile is constant over time, and that consumption at each age grows over 
time at a rate determined by the after-tax interest rate and the rate of time preference: 
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where nr  is the after-tax interest rate, and h is the marginal rate of substitution function of 
homothetic utility.  
We solve the equations (13)-(15) for the consumption level over time for each generation, 
using the estimated age-consumption profile (see Table 8), under the assumption that the 
growth rate of consumption (η ) for each age group is the same as the wage growth rate22. 
Figure 7 reports the predicted savings rates over time under the situation where the current 
fiscal policies are maintained. The altruistic family model produces similar predictions to 
those based on the life-cycle model. The national savings rate declines to 4% around 2065, 
and government savings rate turns to negative value. The difference in the predicted savings 
rates between the two frameworks is in the trend of private savings rate. The consumption 
smoothing across generations due to the altruism between generations produces different 
trend of private savings rate from that under the life-cyle framwork: the private savings rate 
predicted under the altruistic family model is lower in the transition preriod when the 
population rapidly ages than that under the life-cycle model, while the private savings rate in 
the long-run is higher under the former.  
Effects of annuitization of wealth 
The prediction of the savings rate under the life-cycle framework, described in sections 3 
and 4, is based on the assumption that the propensity to consume does not change over time 
and is the same regardless of the kind of wealth. However, the previous researches, such as 
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1992) and Kotlikoff et al. (1996), suggested the possibility of rise in 
the propensity to consume resulting from the annuitization of wealth. The investigation of the 
effect of the annuitization of wealth in Korean context is very suggestive, since the proportion 
of the current asset holdings including housing and real estate is projected to decrease (see 
Table 11). In addition, the increase in the old age population and maturing of public pensions, 
and introduction of reverse annuity mortgages imply that the household wealth will be 
substantially annuitized.  
In order to investigate the effects of the annuitization of household wealth, we estimate the 
consumption functions at the individual level, which include current asset holdings, human 
wealth, and net pension wealth as explanatory variables. For the estimation, we use 1999-
2002 KLIPS sample, which is used to estimate the average propensity to consume (see section 
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 We assume that the nomial intrest rate is 5%. We adjust the intrest rate to this value in order to prevent the 
labor income share from diverging from the range of 60-73%.  
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4.1). For the estimation of consumption functions, we include the individuals, who belong to 
the age group 15-64, and have positive non-capital income. We use log values of consumption 
and those of explanatory variables as well as their absolute level for the estimation. We 
include the age and the age squared as explanatory variables to control the differing 
preference across age groups.  
Table 15 shows mixed implication of the annitization of wealth. When we use the 1999-
2002 samples separately or the pooled sample, the elasticity of consumption with respect to 
the net pension wealth is smaller than that with respect to the current asset holdings23 . 
Moreover, the coefficient for the current asset holdings in the estimation using the level 
variables is larger than that for the net pension wealth in most cases, which implies that the 
marginal propensity to consume with respect to the former is larger than that with respect to 
the latter. This suggests that the annuitization of wealth will not lower the savings rate. 
However, using fixed-effect panel equations produces larger elasticity of consumption and 
marginal propensity to consume with respect to the net pension wealth than those with respect 
to the current asset holdings. Considering the fact that the fixed-effect panel equation 
approach reflects the characteristics of the individuals in the sample better than the pooled 
sample approach or the estimation using a single-year sample, the result suggests that the 
annuitization of wealth in the future in Korea, due to the population aging, maturing of public 
pensions, and introduction of reverse annuity mortgages, will further reduce the savings rate 
in the future. 
We also estimate the consumption function at the household level, since the individual’s 
consumption used as the dependent variable in the estimation of consumption function at the 
individual level is constructed by allocating the household consumption based on Austrailia’s 
age-profile of consumption (see Table 7). We use household consumption (and its log value), 
which is reported in KLIPS, as the dependent variable, and include the number of household 
members, primary income earner’s age, the age squared, and each household’s total values of 
current asset holdings, human wealth, and net pension wealth, as explanatory variables. Table 
16 shows that change of analysis unit from the individual level to the household level does not 
change the structure of consumption functions estimated using the fixed-effect models and 
moreover it reinforces our prediction that the annuitization of wealth is likely to further lower 
the savings rate, because the marginal propensity to consume with respect to the net pension 
wealth estimated using single-year samples or the pooled sample is larger than that with 
respect to the current asset holdings in most cases.  
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 This result may be partly due to the measurement error incurred in computing the value of the net pension 
wealth.  
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It is remarkable that maturing of the NPS is likely to further increase consumption level. 
Table 16 shows the coefficient for the product of dummy variables, for the NPS participation 
as opposed to the OCP, and the value of net pension wealth, is negative and significantly 
different from 0 in most of cases24, which implies that the elasticity of consumption with 
respect to net pension wealth is smaller for the NPS participants than that for the OCP 
participants. It is probably due to the fact that the history of the NPS is very short and most of 
the NPS participants have not acquired the entitlement to pension benefits. Therefore, it is 
highly likely that the maturing of the NPS will raise the elasticity of consumption with respect 
to the net NPS wealth at least to the level with respect to the net OCP wealth in the future, 
which will further reduce the savings rate. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has investigated the effects of population aging and fiscal policies on the 
national savings rate of the future. For the prediction of the national savings rate of Korea for 
the next several decades, we employ a life-cycle model, which incorporates the generational 
accounting approach needed to assess the distribution of fiscal burden across generations, 
and we try a sensitivity analysis by using an altruistic family model to investigate the effects 
of altruism among generations on the savings rates. We also study the effects of change in 
asset composition, such as annuitization of asset resulting from maturing of public pensions 
and introduction of reverse annuity mortgages by estimating consumption functions, which 
enables comparison of elasticity of consumption with respect to the magnitude of various 
kinds of wealth. We found that the rapid population aging and long-term budgetary 
imbalance will substantially lower the national savings rate in Korea, and that the existence 
of the altruism among generations does not produce qualitatively different results. In addition, 
the estimation results of consumption functions with respect to various kinds of wealth 
suggest that the annuitization of wealth due to maturing of public pensions and introduction 
of reverse annuity mortgage is likely to further decrease the savings rate in the future. 
In addition to the population aging and the generational imbalance of fiscal burden, 
premature reunification of South and North Korea will be a large burden of South Korean 
taxpayers. Auerbach et al. (2005) showed that to finance the reunification cost, tax burden of 
cohorts alive in 2010 and thereafter should be raised by about 30% of tax burden under 
current fiscal policies, which will further reduce national savings of the future. In order to 
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 The coefficient is significantly different from 0 at 5% significance level in the case of pooled sample II level 
and log equation. The P-value of the coefficient is 5.4% in the fixed-effect panel estimation (fixed-effect II) 
using log variables. In the case of the fixed-effect panel equation using level variables, the coefficient is not   
significantly different from 0.  
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restore the sustainability of fiscal policies as well as to prevent a drastic decrease in the 
savings rate, fundamental reforms of fiscal policies, such as public pension reform, Medical 
Insurance reform, and restructuring of government consumption policies, are necessary. 
This paper needs some methodological revisions. Since we adopted a life-cycle framework, 
under which we implicitly assume that the propensity to consume is the same across various 
kinds of wealth. However, the estimated consumption functions suggest that change in the 
composition of wealth induce drifts of the propensity to consume. Construction of the model, 
which enables the analysis of the effects of asset composition changes, will be an important 
agenda for our future research. 
Our projection suggests a drastic decrease in asset holdings due to population aging and 
fiscal policies. The prediction may exaggerate the decreasing trend of asset holdings and 
savings rate, since our approach is a partial equilibrium approach. A general equilibrium 
approach needs to be considered, because the general equilibrium change in factor prices (i.e. 
rise in rate of return to capital) resulting from decrease in capital stock, mitigates the drastic 
downward trend of asset holdings. 
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Table 1. Demographic Structure and Dependency Ratios of Selected Countries (%) 
 
Demographic Structure Total Dependency Ratio 
2000 2030 Country 
0-14 15-64 65+ 0-14 15-64 65+ 2000 2030 
World 29.7 63.4 6.9 22.4 65.8 11.8 57.7 52.0 
Developed 
Countries 18.2 67.4 14.4 15.4 62.0 22.6 48.4 61.3 
Developing 
Countries 32.5 62.4 5.1 23.6 66.5 9.9 60.3 50.4 
Japan 14.7 68.1 17.2 12.7 59.3 28.0 46.8 68.6 
U.S.A 21.5 66.0 12.5 17.8 61.6 20.6 51.5 62.3 
Italy 14.3 67.5 18.2 11.6 59.3 29.1 48.1 68.6 
France 18.7 65.4 15.9 16.9 59.9 23.2 52.9 66.9 
China 24.9 68.3 6.8 17.3 67.0 15.7 46.4 49.3 
India 33.3 61.7 5.0 22.3 68.0 9.7 62.1 47.1 
Korea 21.1 71.7 7.2 12.4 64.6 23.1 39.5 54.9 
Source: United Nations, World Population Projections, 1998 
 
 
Table 2. Speed of Population Aging of Selected Countries 
 
 Year Attained Number of Years Required for Transition 
Proportion of Old 
Population1) 7% 14% 20% 7%→14% 14%→20% 
Japan 1970 1994 2006 24 12 
France 1864 1979 2020 115 41 
Germany 1932 1972 2012 40 40 
U.K. 1929 1976 2021 47 45 
Italy 1927 1988 2007 61 19 
U.S.A 1942 2013 2028 71 15 
Korea 2000 2019 2026 19 7 
Source: United Nations, The Sex and Age distribution of World Population, each year 
Note: 1) Proportion of the population aged 65 and older. 
 
Table 3. Fertility Assumptions (unit: persons / 1,000 women) 
Year Low Fertility 
Medium Fertility 
(base case) High Fertility 
2000 
2005 
2010 
2015 
2020 
2025 
2030 
2040- 
1.47 
1.35 
1.32 
1.31 
1.27 
1.21 
1.15 
1.10 
1.47 
1.38 
1.37 
1.37 
1.37 
1.38 
1.39 
1.40 
1.47 
1.43 
1.45 
1.50 
1.54 
1.61 
1.69 
1.80 
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Table 4. Characteristics of KLIPS sample (2002 KLIPS sample) 
 
 Population distribution Employment rate Average annual income (1,000 won) 
Age Male Female Male Female Male Female 
15-19 
20-24 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
45-49 
50-54 
55-59 
60-64 
65-69 
70-74 
75-79 
80-84 
85-90 
90+ 
380 
293 
418 
454 
419 
445 
374 
299 
219 
142 
100 
53 
24 
12 
5 
0 
358 
415 
403 
376 
379 
381 
332 
266 
208 
227 
178 
130 
105 
50 
26 
8 
0.047  
0.314  
0.687  
0.874  
0.902  
0.892  
0.874  
0.866  
0.772  
0.754  
0.640  
0.472  
0.250  
0.333  
0.000  
0.000 
0.078  
0.482  
0.526  
0.436  
0.475  
0.528  
0.482  
0.474  
0.288  
0.233  
0.135  
0.100  
0.019  
0.020  
0.000  
0.000 
6,687  
10,143  
15,963  
20,942  
24,807  
24,491  
25,756  
26,436  
19,336  
13,203  
13,013  
8,981  
4,260  
12,060  
0  
0  
7,423  
12,076  
13,536  
14,737  
13,075  
13,876  
11,843  
11,927  
8,354  
7,617  
6,940  
2,714  
4,800  
2,400  
0  
0 
 
 
Table 5. Net government transfer wealth 
 
 Net public pension wealth 
(1,000 won) 
Ratio of net government 
transfer to net pension 
wealth 
Net government transfer 
wealth (1,000 won) 
Age Male Female Male Female Male Female 
15-19 
20-24 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
45-49 
50-54 
55-59 
60-64 
65-69 
70-74 
75-79 
80-84 
85-89 
90-94 
95+ 
12,278  
13,594  
18,699  
27,886  
38,279  
44,533  
49,602  
53,641  
28,077  
6,514  
10,088  
2,090  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0 
8,903  
10,249  
12,639  
15,228  
19,555  
20,217  
17,115  
13,360  
3,752  
2,262  
1,671  
934  
348  
0  
0  
0  
0 
-5.90  
-6.18  
-5.49  
-2.77  
-1.32  
-1.32  
-1.28  
-0.81  
-0.37  
-1.15  
-1.37  
-2.47  
-2.70  
-1.39  
0.46  
2.80  
5.80 
-4.80  
-4.08  
-3.02  
-1.89  
-1.17  
-1.25  
-1.03  
-0.29  
-0.19  
-1.49  
-2.17  
-5.89  
-6.90  
-4.18  
1.19  
13.94  
27.18 
-72,443  
-84,009  
-102,658  
-77,243  
-50,528  
-58,783  
-63,491  
-43,449  
-10,388  
-7,491  
-13,820  
-5,161  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0 
-42,736  
-41,816  
-38,169  
-28,781  
-22,880  
-25,271  
-17,629  
-3,874  
-713  
-3,370  
-3,626  
-5,499  
-2,403  
0  
0  
0  
0 
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Table 6. Composition of Wealth (2002 KLIPS sample, 1,000 won) 
 
 Current asset holdings Human wealth Net government transfer 
wealth 
Age Male Female Male Female Male Female 
15-19 
20-24 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
45-49 
50-54 
55-59 
60-64 
65-69 
70-74 
75-79 
80-84 
85-89 
90-94 
95+ 
101  
7,621  
13,694  
30,600  
50,813  
54,826  
62,701  
77,351  
80,646  
75,828  
78,817  
92,685  
47,469  
42,306  
62,100  
0  
0 
149  
2,889  
22,580  
32,602  
57,365  
57,409  
69,142  
62,850  
70,791  
66,876  
61,860  
49,102  
26,347  
29,215  
18,300  
7,500  
0 
464,594  
527,751  
557,049  
547,875  
493,474  
409,820  
339,778  
255,087  
148,242  
92,097  
62,572  
21,315  
4,208  
1,515  
0  
0  
0 
167,397  
177,062  
162,465  
142,664  
116,059  
97,866  
67,157  
45,279  
21,792  
12,672  
5,887  
1,415  
278  
0  
0  
0  
0 
-72,443  
-84,009  
-102,658  
-77,243  
-50,528  
-58,783  
-63,491  
-43,449  
-10,388  
-7,491  
-13,820  
-5,161  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0 
-42,736  
-41,816  
-38,169  
-28,781  
-22,880  
-25,271  
-17,629  
-3,874  
-713  
-3,370  
-3,626  
-5,499  
-2,403  
0  
0  
0  
0 
 
 
 
Table 7. Age profile of consumption within family 
 
 0-15 16-24 25-39 40-49 50-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75+ 
Australia 
U.S.A 
0.68 
0.72 
0.89 
0.72 
1.00 
1.00 
0.98 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.05 
1.00 
0.87 
1.27 
0.95 
1.27 
1.19 
1.27 
Source: Besanger et al. (2000)  
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Table 8. Average propensity to consume (2002 KLIPS sample) 
 
 Average wealth (A) Average consumption (B) Average propensity to 
consume (A/B) 
Age Male Female Male Female Male Female 
15-19 
20-24 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
45-49 
50-54 
55-59 
60-64 
65-69 
70-74 
75-79 
80-84 
85-89 
90-94 
95+ 
392,253  
451,363  
468,085  
501,231  
493,759  
405,863  
338,989  
288,988  
218,500  
160,435  
127,569  
108,839  
51,677  
43,821  
62,100  
0  
0 
124,810  
138,135  
146,876  
146,486  
150,544  
130,004  
118,670  
104,255  
91,870  
76,178  
64,121  
45,017  
24,222  
29,215  
18,300  
7,500  
0 
4,915  
4,578  
6,101  
8,779  
10,769  
10,628  
9,379  
9,031  
7,960  
6,737  
6,139  
5,062  
3,897  
3,480  
4,354  
0  
0 
4,956  
4,937  
5,715  
7,104  
7,245  
6,908  
6,061  
5,699  
5,329  
6,073  
4,912  
4,774  
4,879  
5,331  
6,076  
4,294  
4,460 
0.013  
0.010  
0.013  
0.018  
0.022  
0.026  
0.028  
0.031  
0.036  
0.042  
0.048  
0.047  
0.076 1) 
0.0761)  
0.0761)  
0.0761)  
0.0761) 
0.040  
0.036  
0.039  
0.048  
0.048  
0.053  
0.051  
0.055  
0.058  
0.080  
0.077  
0.106  
0.2141)  
0.2141)  
0.2141)  
0.2141)  
0.2141) 
Note: 1) we assume that the average propensity to consume is same for the cohorts aged 75 and older. 
 
Table 9. Average propensity to consume (1999-2002 KLIPS sample) 
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 Average (1999-2002) 
Age Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
15-19 
20-24 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
45-49 
50-54 
55-59 
60-64 
65-69 
70-74 
75+ 
0.013  
0.011  
0.014  
0.018  
0.024  
0.028  
0.029  
0.032  
0.036  
0.041  
0.048  
0.057 
0.092 
0.044  
0.039  
0.041  
0.049  
0.054  
0.048  
0.041  
0.042  
0.056  
0.060  
0.072  
0.088  
0.235 
0.012  
0.010  
0.013  
0.018  
0.024  
0.028  
0.030  
0.033  
0.037  
0.043  
0.053  
0.046  
0.137 
0.042  
0.040  
0.046  
0.050  
0.057  
0.052  
0.048  
0.047  
0.058  
0.061  
0.074  
0.085  
0.242 
0.012  
0.010  
0.013  
0.016  
0.021  
0.027  
0.025  
0.030  
0.030  
0.040  
0.039  
0.033  
0.093 
0.041  
0.036  
0.043  
0.045  
0.049  
0.046  
0.045  
0.045  
0.050  
0.058  
0.084  
0.083  
0.207 
0.013  
0.010  
0.013  
0.018  
0.022  
0.026  
0.028  
0.031  
0.036  
0.042  
0.048  
0.047  
0.076 
0.040  
0.036  
0.039  
0.048  
0.048  
0.053  
0.051  
0.055  
0.058  
0.080  
0.077  
0.106  
0.214 
0.012  
0.010  
0.013  
0.017  
0.023  
0.027  
0.028  
0.031  
0.035  
0.041  
0.047  
0.046  
0.099 
(0.05)1) 
0.042  
0.038  
0.042  
0.048  
0.052  
0.050  
0.046  
0.047  
0.056  
0.065  
0.077  
0.091  
0.225 
(0.123) 1) 
Note: 1) adjusted value used in predictions of savings rate 

Table 10. Generational Accounts (GA1, 1,000 won)  
 
Age Net Payment  
Public 
Pensions 
Medical 
Ins. 
Employ. 
Ins. IACI
1) MLSS2) OSTP3) 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
40 
45 
50 
55 
60 
65 
70 
75 
80 
85 
90 
95 
99 
56,025  
62,689  
67,649  
67,707  
77,218  
73,675  
64,700  
39,226  
36,720  
32,425  
22,226  
12,788  
14,370  
8,448  
6,407  
5,837  
2,818  
541  
-2,543  
-1,508  
-485 
-9,349  
-8,914  
-9,174  
-14,596  
-11,430  
-15,271  
-18,117  
-35,332  
-27,882  
-23,520  
-22,910  
-21,396  
-8,371  
-6,317  
-3,756  
-1,366  
-990  
-626  
-324  
-223  
-10  
-5,100  
-4,164  
-3,793  
-3,687  
-3,746  
-4,433  
-5,248  
-5,936  
-6,834  
-7,514  
-8,034  
-8,219  
-7,764  
-6,864  
-5,476  
-4,185  
-3,243  
-2,376  
-1,635  
-1,022  
-384 
-684  
-765  
-844  
-933  
-958  
-819  
-706  
-625  
-590  
-512  
-450  
-411  
-324  
-245  
-233  
-181  
-136  
-98  
-67  
-42  
-16  
186  
220  
244  
260  
261  
238  
166  
143  
15  
-9  
-16  
95  
17  
19  
-54  
-43  
-33  
-25  
-18  
-11  
-4  
-2,544  
-2,501  
-2,431  
-2,364  
-2,281  
-2,183  
-2,145  
-2,104  
-2,098  
-2,076  
-1,995  
-1,958  
-1,894  
-1,742  
-1,468  
-979  
-665  
-340  
-260  
0  
0 
-3,344  
-3,349  
-3,231  
-3,162  
-3,136  
-3,106  
-3,056  
-2,927  
-2,832  
-2,716  
-2,593  
-2,475  
-2,381  
-2,287  
-1,889  
-1,491  
-1,144  
-864  
-612  
-392  
-149 
Future 
Gen. 122,341 41,676 14,316 1,478 -487   
Age 
Labor 
Income 
Tax 
Capital 
Income 
Tax 
Con- 
sump-
tion Tax 
Tax on 
Asset 
Holding 
Asset 
Transac-
tions Tax 
Other 
Taxes 
Seign- 
iorage 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
40 
45 
50 
55 
60 
65 
70 
75 
80 
85 
90 
95 
99 
7,265  
8,174  
8,982  
9,815  
10,624  
10,788  
9,951  
9,535  
7,761  
6,169  
4,033  
1,985  
588  
54  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0 
12,769  
14,788  
16,849  
19,160  
22,412  
23,492  
23,057  
21,978  
20,860  
20,016  
17,248  
15,181  
11,291  
8,582  
6,323  
4,101  
2,239  
974  
131  
49  
28 
37,745  
38,513  
38,963  
39,601  
40,150  
39,102  
36,440  
33,071  
29,603  
26,144  
22,862  
19,278  
15,834  
12,681  
9,893  
7,975  
5,453  
3,198  
52  
33  
13 
3,935  
4,404  
4,856  
5,368  
5,952  
6,207  
6,186  
5,939  
5,569  
5,318  
4,689  
3,830  
2,957  
2,082  
1,517  
908  
566  
233  
31  
3  
1 
8,745  
9,540  
10,199  
10,889  
11,680  
11,901  
10,837  
8,902  
7,275  
5,925  
4,895  
3,243  
1,601  
393  
38  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0 
6,227  
6,549  
6,813  
7,113  
7,417  
7,495  
7,077  
6,344  
5,638  
4,989  
4,299  
3,459  
2,655  
1,963  
1,404  
1,023  
708  
422  
125  
76  
29 
172  
194  
217  
244  
275  
264  
258  
239  
236  
211  
198  
175  
163  
130  
108  
74  
63  
42  
33  
19  
6 
Note: 1) LACI represents Labor’s Accident Compensation Insurance, which is Korean version 
of Worker’s Compensation. 
          2) MLSS represents Minimum Living Standards Security System, which is public aid 
program to low income classes 
         3) OSTP represents the other social transfer programs. 
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Table 11. Predicted Values (current policy, medium fertility) 
(unit: 1 trillion won, 2002-fixed price) 
Wealth Annual values 
Taxes and government transfer Year 
Total Asset-holdings 
Human 
wealth 
Transfer 
Wealth 
Non-
capital 
income Net 
transfer 
Transfer 
payment taxes 
Gov’t 
Consump. 
Budget 
deficit 
Private 
consump. GDP 
2002 
2005 
2010 
2015 
2020 
2025 
2030 
2035 
2040 
2045 
2050 
2055 
2060 
2065 
2070 
2075 
2080 
2085 
2090 
15,408  
16,084  
17,134  
18,063  
18,849  
19,531  
20,064  
20,410  
20,574  
20,584  
20,497  
20,398  
20,342  
20,369  
20,495  
20,724  
21,054  
21,487  
22,026 
4,213  
4,262  
4,320  
4,336  
4,301  
4,222  
4,105  
3,936  
3,699  
3,395  
3,061  
2,717  
2,395  
2,141  
1,985  
1,910  
1,846  
1,767  
1,658 
13,564  
14,148  
15,001  
15,695  
16,228  
16,677  
17,017  
17,232  
17,353  
17,420  
17,450  
17,506  
17,602  
17,739  
17,897  
18,087  
18,366  
18,757  
19,277 
-2,369  
-2,326  
-2,187  
-1,967  
-1,679  
-1,367  
-1,058  
-759  
-479  
-230  
-13  
175  
345  
489  
613  
728  
842  
963  
1,091 
411  
444  
500  
550  
594  
635  
670  
697  
712  
721  
726  
726  
728  
728  
735  
734  
733  
735  
738 
-122  
-131  
-141  
-147  
-147  
-139  
-127  
-113  
-98  
-82  
-68  
-58  
-48  
-37  
-29  
-24  
-22  
-21  
-18 
29  
34  
45  
57  
74  
96  
120  
144  
167  
190  
211  
225  
238  
251  
261  
268  
272  
275  
279 
153  
167  
187  
206  
223  
237  
250  
260  
268  
275  
281  
287  
290  
292  
294  
297  
299  
301  
302 
109  
115  
126  
136  
145  
155  
165  
174  
183  
190  
196  
199  
202  
205  
208  
210  
211  
212  
214 
-13  
-16  
-14  
-12  
-2  
16  
38  
61  
86  
108  
128  
141  
155  
169  
179  
186  
189  
192  
196 
389  
415  
463  
507  
548  
587  
621  
645  
661  
665  
660  
651  
642  
635  
632  
633  
637  
644  
654 
685  
720  
780  
831  
873  
910  
938  
953  
952  
942  
925  
902  
884  
867  
864  
858  
853  
850  
846 
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Table 12. Annual Growth Rate of Predicted Values (current policy, medium fertility, %) 
 
Wealth Annual values 
Taxes and government transfer Year 
Total Asset-holdings 
Human 
wealth 
Transfer 
Wealth 
Non-
capital 
income Net 
transfer 
Transfer 
payment taxes 
Gov’t 
Cons. 
Budget 
deficit 
Private 
cons.. 
GDP 
2002 
2005 
2010 
2015 
2020 
2025 
2030 
2035 
2040 
2045 
2050 
2055 
2060 
2065 
2070 
2075 
2080 
2085 
2090 
1.5  
1.4  
1.2  
1.0  
0.8  
0.6  
0.4  
0.2  
0.1  
-0.1  
-0.1  
-0.1  
0.0  
0.1  
0.2  
0.3  
0.4  
0.5  
0.6 
0.4  
0.3  
0.2  
-0.1  
-0.3  
-0.5  
-0.7  
-1.1  
-1.6  
-2.0  
-2.3  
-2.6  
-2.4  
-1.9  
-1.0  
-0.7  
-0.7  
-1.1  
-1.5 
1.5  
1.3  
1.1  
0.8  
0.6  
0.5  
0.3  
0.2  
0.1  
0.0  
0.0  
0.1  
0.1  
0.2  
0.2  
0.3  
0.4  
0.5  
0.7 
-
1)
  
-  
-  
-  
-  
-  
-  
-  
-  
-  
-  
20.9  
9.3  
5.5  
3.9  
3.2  
2.9  
2.7  
2.4 
2.7  
2.6  
2.2  
1.7  
1.4  
1.3  
1.0  
0.5  
0.3  
0.3  
0.0  
0.1  
-0.1  
0.2  
0.1  
-0.1  
0.0  
0.1  
0.1 
-
1)
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
5.4  
6.1  
5.0  
5.9  
5.7  
5.2  
4.2  
3.3  
2.9  
2.3  
1.7  
1.2  
1.2  
0.9  
0.7  
0.3  
0.2  
0.2  
0.3 
3.1  
2.6  
2.3  
1.8  
1.4  
1.1  
0.9  
0.7  
0.6  
0.5  
0.4  
0.3  
0.2  
0.2  
0.2  
0.1  
0.1  
0.1  
0.1 
1.9  
1.9  
1.6  
1.4  
1.3  
1.3  
1.2  
1.1  
0.9  
0.6  
0.5  
0.3  
0.3  
0.3  
0.2  
0.1  
0.1  
0.1  
0.2 
-
1)
 
- 
- 
- 
-  
28.1  
12.7  
8.3  
5.8  
4.0  
2.5  
1.8  
2.0  
1.4  
1.0  
0.5  
0.2  
0.3  
0.6 
2.3  
2.3  
2.1  
1.8  
1.5  
1.3  
1.0  
0.6  
0.3  
0.0  
-0.3  
-0.3  
-0.3  
-0.1  
0.0  
0.1  
0.2  
0.3  
0.3 
1.8  
1.8  
1.5  
1.1  
0.9  
0.8  
0.5  
0.1  
-0.2  
-0.3  
-0.5  
-0.4  
-0.5  
-0.1  
-0.1  
-0.2  
-0.1  
-0.1  
-0.1 
Note: 1) The growth rates of these components are not reported because their absolute level is negative. 
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Table 13. Predicted National Savings Rates (% of GDP)  
 
Year Low fertility1) Medium fertility1) High fertility1) 
 Current 
policy 
Pre-
funding 
Balanced 
budget 
Current 
policy 
Pre-
funding 
Balanced 
budget 
Current 
policy 
Pre-
funding 
Balanced 
budget 
2002 
2005 
2010 
2015 
2020 
2025 
2030 
2035 
2040 
2045 
2050 
2055 
2060 
2065 
2070 
2075 
2080 
2085 
2090 
27.1  
26.3  
24.5  
22.8  
20.7  
18.7  
16.6  
14.3  
12.0  
10.0  
8.5  
6.6  
5.0  
3.3  
2.5  
0.5  
-1.9  
-5.0  
-8.8 
29.4  
29.0  
28.3  
26.4  
24.2  
21.9  
19.7  
17.5  
14.9  
12.9  
11.2  
9.2  
7.6  
5.6  
4.8  
2.7  
0.0  
-3.1  
-7.1 
27.5 
27.0 
26.2 
25.5 
24.7 
24.0 
23.1 
22.1 
20.8 
19.8 
19.0 
17.9 
17.0 
15.8 
15.3 
13.5 
11.3 
8.6  
5.3 
27.2  
26.3  
24.5  
22.8  
20.6  
18.5  
16.2  
13.9  
11.4  
9.2  
7.5  
5.7  
4.4  
3.0  
2.8  
1.6  
0.4  
-1.0  
-2.7 
29.4  
29.1  
28.4  
26.3  
24.1  
21.8  
19.5  
17.0  
14.3  
12.1  
10.3  
8.5  
7.0  
5.6  
5.2  
4.1  
2.8  
1.4  
-0.4 
27.5 
27.0 
26.2 
25.5 
24.7 
23.8 
22.8 
21.6 
20.0 
18.7 
17.6 
16.3 
15.4 
14.2 
13.7 
12.4 
11.0 
9.5  
7.8 
27.2  
26.3  
24.6  
22.7  
20.5  
18.2  
15.7  
13.3  
10.5  
8.0  
6.3  
4.6  
3.6  
2.8  
2.9  
2.5  
2.3  
2.4  
2.3 
29.5  
29.2  
28.4  
26.4  
24.0  
21.6  
19.0  
16.4  
13.5  
11.0  
9.2  
7.5  
6.4  
5.5  
5.7  
5.2  
5.1  
5.1  
5.1 
27.6  
27.1  
26.3  
25.6  
24.6  
23.6  
22.4  
20.9  
19.0  
17.3  
15.9  
14.4  
13.4  
12.3  
12.1  
11.2  
10.6  
10.3 
9.9 
Note: 1) The fertility assumption is shown in Table 3. 
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Table 14. Composition of National Savings Rates (% of GDP)  
 
Low fertility1) Medium fertility1) High fertility1) 
Current policy Prefunding Balanced budget Current policy Prefunding 
Balanced 
budget Current policy Prefunding 
Balanced 
budget Year 
Privat Gov’t Privat Gov’t Privat Gov’t Privat Gov’t Privat Gov’t Privat Gov’t Privat Gov’t Privat Gov’t Privat Gov’t 
2002 
2005 
2010 
2015 
2020 
2025 
2030 
2035 
2040 
2045 
2050 
2055 
2060 
2065 
2070 
2075 
2080 
2085 
2090 
25.3  
24.2  
22.7  
21.4  
20.4  
20.3  
20.4  
20.5  
20.7  
21.2  
22.1  
22.3  
23.0  
23.7  
24.7  
24.3  
23.3  
21.7  
19.9 
1.8  
2.1  
1.8  
1.4  
0.3  
-1.6  
-3.8  
-6.2  
-8.7  
-11.2  
-13.6  
-15.7  
-18.0  
-20.4  
-22.2  
-23.8  
-25.2  
-26.7  
-28.7 
27.6  
26.9  
21.0  
19.3  
18.0  
17.5  
17.4  
17.4  
17.3  
17.6  
18.2  
18.2  
18.7  
19.2  
20.2  
19.6  
18.4  
16.7  
14.6 
1.8  
2.1  
7.3  
7.1  
6.2  
4.4  
2.3  
0.1  
-2.4  
-4.7  
-7.0  
-9.0  
-11.1  
-13.6  
-15.4  
-16.9  
-18.4  
-19.8  
-21.7 
27.5  
27.0  
26.2  
25.5  
24.7  
24.0  
23.1  
22.1  
20.8  
19.8  
19.0  
17.9  
17.0  
15.8  
15.3  
13.5  
11.3  
8.6  
5.3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
25.4  
24.2  
22.7  
21.4  
20.4  
20.2  
20.2  
20.3  
20.4  
20.7  
21.3  
21.4  
21.9  
22.5  
23.5  
23.3  
22.6  
21.6  
20.5 
1.8  
2.1  
1.8  
1.4  
0.2  
-1.7  
-4.0  
-6.4  
-9.0  
-11.5  
-13.8  
-15.7  
-17.5  
-19.5  
-20.7  
-21.7  
-22.2  
-22.6  
-23.2 
27.6  
27.0  
21.1  
19.3  
18.0  
17.5  
17.3  
17.1  
16.9  
17.0  
17.4  
17.2  
17.5  
18.0  
18.9  
18.7  
17.9  
16.8  
15.6 
1.8  
2.1  
7.3  
7.0  
6.1  
4.3  
2.2  
-0.1  
-2.6  
-4.9  
-7.1  
-8.7  
-10.5  
-12.4  
-13.7  
-14.6  
-15.1  
-15.4  
-16.0 
27.5 
27.0 
26.2 
25.5 
24.7 
23.8 
22.8 
21.6 
20.0 
18.7 
17.6 
16.3 
15.4 
14.2 
13.7 
12.4 
11.0 
9.5 
7.8 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
25.4  
24.2  
22.8  
21.4  
20.4  
20.1  
20.0  
20.0  
19.9  
19.9  
20.4  
20.2  
20.6  
21.1  
21.9  
21.8  
21.6  
21.4  
21.0 
1.8  
2.1  
1.8  
1.3  
0.1  
-1.9  
-4.3  
-6.7  
-9.4  
-11.9  
-14.1  
-15.6  
-17.0  
-18.3  
-19.0  
-19.3  
-19.3  
-19.0  
-18.7 
27.7  
27.1  
21.1  
19.4  
18.0  
17.4  
17.0  
16.7  
16.3  
16.1  
16.3  
15.9  
16.1  
16.4  
17.3  
17.1  
16.9  
16.6  
16.3 
1.8  
2.1  
7.3  
7.0  
6.0  
4.2  
2.0  
-0.3  
-2.8  
-5.1  
-7.1  
-8.4  
-9.7  
-10.9  
-11.6  
-11.9  
-11.8  
-11.5  
-11.2 
27.6  
27.1  
26.3  
25.6  
24.6  
23.6  
22.4  
20.9  
19.0  
17.3  
15.9  
14.4  
13.4  
12.3  
12.1  
11.2  
10.6  
10.3  
9.9  
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Note: 1) The fertility assumption is shown in Table 3. 
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Table 15. Individual Consumption Functions  
 
 Dependent variable: consumption 
 1999 
sample 
2000 
sample 
2001 
sample 
2002 
sample 
Pooled 
sample 
Fixed 
effect 
constant -652.3 (54.4)1) 
-623.7 
(61.4) 
-543.7 
(69.8) 
-726.6 
(80.1) 
-562.2 
(34.62) 
-641.4 
(77.1) 
age 42.48 (2.80) 
42.93 
(3.12) 
50.23 
(3.55) 
53.17 
(4.036) 
44.04 
(7.762) 
46.316 
(3.910) 
age2 -0.442 (0.034) 
-0.443 
(0.037) 
-0.571 
(0.042) 
-0.552 
(0.047) 
-0.470 
(0.021) 
-0.458 
(0.046) 
asset 
holdings(x1) 
0.011 
(0.0008) 
<0.071>2) 
0.012 
(0.0009) 
<0.069> 
0.017 
(0.0009) 
<0.101> 
0.018 
(0.0009) 
<0.102> 
0.016 
(0.0004) 
<0.095> 
0.011 
(0.007) 
<0.065> 
human 
wealth (x2) 
0.006 
(0.0002) 
<0.364> 
0.006 
(0.0002) 
<0.344> 
0.002 
(0.0001) 
<0.120> 
0.005 
(0.0002) 
<0.267> 
0.004 
(0.0009) 
<0.23> 
0.003 
(0.0001) 
<0.17> 
net pen. 
wealth (x3) 
0.012 
(0.002) 
<0.053> 
0.012 
(0.002) 
<0.055> 
0.013 
(0.002) 
<0.062> 
0.013 
(0.002) 
<0.057> 
0.016 
(0.001) 
<0.073> 
0.029 
(0.0019) 
<0.132> 
 Dependent variable: log(consumption) 
constant -5.641 (0.442) 
-5.365 
(0.422) 
-4.937 
(0.360) 
-5.214 
(0.322) 
-6.146 
(0.188) 
-7.354 
(0.358) 
age 0.090 (0.0048) 
0.075 
(0.0049) 
0.080 
(0.0046) 
0.064 
(0.0043) 
0.071 
(0.002) 
0.063 
(0.0052) 
age2 -0.0008 (0.00006) 
-0.0007 
(0.0006) 
-0.0007 
(0.00005) 
-0.0005 
(0.0005) 
-0.0006 
(0.00002) 
-0.0004 
(0.00006) 
log(x1)3) 0.224 (0.021) 
0.312 
(0.025) 
0.2310 
(0.017) 
0.327 
(0.019) 
0.268 
(0.010) 
0.1601 
(0.016) 
log(x2) 3) 0.596 (0.020) 
0.529 
(0.021) 
0.548 
(0.017) 
0.533 
(0.016) 
0.577 
(0.009) 
0.524 
(0.014) 
log(x3) 3) 0.148 (0.049) 
0.150 
(0.045) 
0.151 
(0.038) 
0.153 
(0.034) 
0.231 
(0.020) 
0.540 
(0.0404) 
Note: 1) represents standard error. 
         2) represents the elasticity evaluated at the mean of the explanatory variable. 
         3) We use log(-min(x1)+1+xi) (i=1,2,3) to avoid negative value for the argument of log 
function. 
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Table 16. Household Consumption Functions 
 
 Dependent variable: consumption 
 1999 
sample 
2000 
sample 
2001 
sample 
2002 
sample 
pooled  
sample I 
pooled 
sample II 
fixed 
effect I 
fixed 
effect II 
constant -450.6 (170.8)1) 
-663.0 
(199.6) 
-605.3 
(198.1) 
-598.4 
(218.5) 
-351.9 
(103.6) 
-366.5 
(112.9) 
268.8 
(204.2) 
107.5 
(214.6) 
# of household 
members 
123.8 
(11.3) 
157.9 
(13.9) 
151.5 
(13.4) 
426.1 
(13.4) 
218.7 
(6.78) 
221.0 
(6.81) 
290.0 
(12.32) 
288.4 
(12.33) 
age 53.9 (7.76) 
63.0 
(8.93) 
66.9 
(8.75) 
49.3 
(9.58) 
44.4 
(4.60) 
45.8 
(4.62) 
11.8 
(8.58) 
10.2 
(8.59) 
age2 -0.63 (0.08) 
-0.73 
(0.09) 
-0.81 
(0.08) 
-0.64 
(0.09) 
-0.57 
(0.04) 
-0.58 
(0.05) 
-0.23 
(0.08) 
-0.21 
(0.08) 
Asset 
holdings(X1) 
0.020 
(0.0009) 
<0.122>2) 
0.019 
(0.0011) 
<0.116> 
0.025 
(0.0010) 
<0.152> 
0.023 
(0.0011) 
<0.140> 
0.023 
(0.0005) 
<0.140> 
0.023 
(0.0005) 
<0.140> 
0.015 
(0.0009) 
<0.091> 
0.015 
(0.0009) 
<0.091> 
human wealth 
(X2) 
0.0010 
(0.0002) 
<0.035> 
0.0021 
(0.0002) 
<0.074> 
0.0021 
(0.0002) 
<0.074> 
0.0024 
(0.0002) 
<0.085> 
0.0024 
(0.0001) 
<0.085> 
0.0025 
(0.0001) 
<0.089> 
0.0021 
(0.0001) 
<0.074> 
0.0020 
(0.0001) 
<0.071> 
net pen. wealth 
(X3) 
0.025 
(0.0038) 
<0.071> 
0.029 
(0.0036) 
<0.082> 
0.026 
(0.0030) 
<0.074> 
0.015 
(0.0033) 
<0.042> 
0.034 
(0.0017) 
<0.097> 
0.037 
(0.0033) 
<0.105> 
0.038 
(0.0025) 
<0.108> 
0.044 
(0.0045) 
<0.125> 
Dum_NPS4) - - - - - -10.48 (51.24) - 
211.2 
(80.41) 
Dum_NPS×X3 - - - - - 
-0.0085 
(0.0039) - 
-0.0027 
(0.0052) 
 Dependent variable: log(consumption) 
Constant -1.158 (0.449) 
-2.253 
(0.430) 
-1.884 
(0.373) 
0.125 
(0.320) 
-2.624 
(0.194) 
-3.358 
(0.483) 
-1.082 
(0.287) 
-2.529 
(0.686) 
# of household 
members 
0.101 
(0.0085) 
0.104 
(0.0096) 
0.092 
(0.0086) 
0.174 
(0.0066) 
0.109 
(0.0042) 
0.111 
(0.0042) 
0.119 
(0.0075) 
0.119 
(0.0075) 
Age 0.065 (0.0058) 
0.073 
(0.0060) 
0.068 
(0.0055) 
0.045 
(0.0046) 
0.059 
(0.0028) 
0.061 
(0.0028) 
0.035 
(0.0052) 
0.034 
(0.0052) 
age2 -0.0007 (0.0006) 
-0.0008 
(0.0006) 
-0.0007 
(0.00005) 
-0.0005 
(0.00004) 
-0.0006 
(0.00003) 
-0.0006 
(0.00003) 
-0.0003 
(0.00005) 
-0.0003 
(0.00005) 
log(X1)3) 0.368 (0.0192) 
0.302 
(0.0190) 
0.348 
(0.0171) 
0.321 
(0.0165) 
0.355 
(0.0093) 
0.351 
(0.0093) 
0.233 
(0.0148) 
0.233 
(0.0148) 
log(X2) 3) 0.211 (0.015) 
0.275 
(0.0164) 
0.253 
(0.0141) 
0.160 
(0.0133) 
0.244 
(0.0076) 
0.253 
(0.0078) 
0.186 
(0.0103) 
0.184 
(0.0106) 
log(X3) 3) 0.073 (0.049) 
0.169 
(0.045) 
0.131 
(0.038) 
0.097 
(0.033) 
0.225 
(0.0209) 
0.294 
(0.0484) 
0.300 
(0.0307) 
0.444 
(0.0682) 
Dum_NPS - - - - - 1.451 (0.525) - 
1.470 
(0.729) 
Dum_NPS× 
log(X3) - - - - - 
-0.156 
(0.053) - 
-0.140 
(0.073) 
Note: 1) represents standard error. 
2) represents the elasticity evaluated at the mean of the explanatory variable. 
3) We use log(-min(x1)+1+xi) (i=1,2,3) to avoid negative value for the argument of log function. 
4) Dummy variable for National Pension Participant’s household 
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